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Abstract
We evaluate the impact of product market uncertainty on workers wages, addressing
the questions: To what extent do ﬁrms provide insurance to their workforce, insulating
their wages from shocks in product markets? How does the amount of insurance provided
vary with ﬁrm and worker attributes? We use a longitudinal matched employer-employee
dataset of remarkable quality. The empirical strategy is based on Guiso et al. (2005).
We ﬁrst estimate dynamic models of sales and wages to retrieve consistent estimates of
shocks to ﬁrms’ sales and to workers’ earnings. We are then able to estimate the sensitivity
of wages to permanent and transitory shocks to ﬁrm performance. Results point to the
rejection of the full insurance hypothesis. Workers’ wages respond to permanent shocks
to ﬁrm performance, whereas they are not sensitive to transitory shocks. Managers are
not fully insured against transitory shocks, while they receive the same protection against
permanent shocks as workers in other occupations. Firms with higher variability in their
sales, and those operating in diﬀerent industries, oﬀer more insurance against permanent
s h o c k s . C o m p a r i s o nw i t hG u i s oet al. (2005) indicates that Portuguese ﬁrms provide less
insurance than Italian ﬁrms, corroborating evidence on the high degree of wage ﬂexibility
in Portugal.
Keywords: product market uncertainty; wage shocks; risk sharing; wage insurance.
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To which extent do ﬁrms provide wage insurance to their workers, insulating them
from shocks in product markets? Theoretical handling of the issue now spans for
several decades, but progress on the empirical front has been held back by very
strict requirements on micro data.
Insurance models can explain why, following a change in demand, wages do not
adjust as much as predicted by spot market theory. The underlying idea is that
risk neutral ﬁrms commit to paying a pre-deﬁned wage to their risk averse workers,
independently of product market ﬂuctuations. Such strategy is proﬁt maximizing
because risk-averse workers will accept a non-stochastic wage lower than the ex-
pected value of a stochastic wage. A central issue concerns the enforceability of
insurance contracts. Building on early insurance models, implicit contract theory
has established conditions under which it is in the ﬁrm’s and in the worker’s inter-
est to stick to the contract. Basically, workers and ﬁrms will respect the contract
as long as its long run gains outweigh the short term beneﬁtf r o mr e n e g i n gi t .
Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical literature.
Empirical studies, which initially relied on aggregate industry data (Gamber
1988, Christoﬁdes and Oswald 1992, Blanchﬂower et al. 1996) progressed to use
ﬁrm-level average data (Hildreth and Oswald 1997, Nickell and Wadhwani 1990).
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) used individual data on workers, but their indicator
of market conditions is computed at the aggregate or industry level. Similarly,
Weinberg (2001) uses individual data to study the impact of displacement on
wages, but relies on a measure of shocks deﬁned at the industry level to analyze
wage and employment ﬂuctuations at the industry level in response to demand
shocks. Devereux (2005) relies on panel data on workers to quantify the impact of
industry-level demand shocks on wages, ﬁnding that industry wages respond pos-
itively to changes in industry employment. Finally, Guiso et al. (2005) have set a
new benchmark in the analysis of this issue. Their ingenious empirical identiﬁca-
tion strategy relies on longitudinal matched employer-employee data to estimate
1dynamic panel data models and quantify the impact of temporary and perma-
nent ﬁrm-level shocks on wages. They found that ﬁrms provide full insurance
against temporary shocks, while providing only partial insurance against perma-
nent shocks. We will follow their empirical strategy with adaptations to analyze
the provision of wage insurance by the ﬁrm.
We use a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset of remarkable qual-
ity, which matches all the ﬁrms and workers in the manufacturing and services
private sectors in Portugal. Several advantages of this rich data set can be high-
lighted. Given that it reports every company and every worker in the industries it
covers, problems commonly faced by longitudinal data sets, such as panel attrition
and under- or over-representation of certain groups, are avoided. Also, the legal
requirement for the data to be posted in a visible location within the company
contributes to its reliability, reducing measurement errors.
After the brief revision of the theoretical literature that follows, section 3 de-
scribes the institutional framework for wage setting in Portugal and section 4
describes the data. Sections 5 to 7 summarize the empirical model and present
the results, before concluding comments are presented in section 8.
2 Wage insurance in the theoretical literature
Theoretical models have long addressed the mechanisms why companies do not
adjust wages as much as predicted by spot labor market theory, once faced with
shocks in product demand. The issue of enforceability of contracts has deserved
particular attention, to establish conditions under which ﬁrms and workers will
stick to a pre-deﬁned contract.
In the models by Baily (1974), Gordon (1974), and Azariadis (1975), workers
are risk-averse and ﬁrms are risk-neutral, worker performance is veriﬁable, and job
mobility is costly. As such, ﬁr m sc o m m i tt op a y i n gap r e - d e ﬁned wage to their
workers, independently of product market ﬂuctuations. That strategy maximizes
proﬁts, since risk-averse workers will accept a non-stochastic wage lower than the
expected value of a stochastic wage. Much earlier, Knight (1921) had argued
2that wages are contractually set in advance at a ﬁxed rate, whereas proﬁts are
determined residually, bearing all the risk of ﬂuctuations in demand.
Gamber (1988) allows for bankruptcy and distinguishes between temporary and
permanent shocks, in a two-period model. The possibility of bankruptcy constrains
the capacity of the ﬁrm to provide insurance to the workers. Gamber ﬁnds that real
wages react more to permanent shocks than to temporary ones. Unlike permanent
shocks, temporary shocks hold for just one period, and therefore the ﬁrm wishing
to smooth the wage of the worker over time promotes a relatively small wage
adjustment in the period the shock occurs, deferring the rest of the adjustment to
the following period.
The issue of enforceability of contracts has been extensively handled by contract
theory (for an overview, see Rosen 1985). If worker performance is not veriﬁable,
the ﬁrm may gain from declaring that it is below its actual level and reneging
the contract, thus paying a wage lower than the insurance wage. The ﬁrm would
stick to the contract only if its long run gains outweighed the short term beneﬁt
from reneging it. Similarly, if worker mobility is allowed, the worker might gain
from reneging the contract and accepting a better outside oﬀer. Implicit contract
theory establishes conditions under which it is in the ﬁr m ’ sa n di nt h ew o r k e r ’ s
interest to stick to the contract. Weiss (1984) concentrates on the role of worker
mobility costs, showing that, in particular when workers have imperfect access
to capital markets, the higher the mobility costs, the more insurance ﬁrms can
provide. Workers will stick to the contract as long as mobility costs–for example,
loss of speciﬁc human capital –outweigh the short-run gains from outside wage
opportunities. In the model by Holmstrom (1981), once the ﬁrm reneges a labor
contract, the loss of reputation will force it to buy labor services at prices closer to
those of the spot market; in the model by Thomas and Worrall (1988), it will be
forced to buy labor on the spot market forever after. The ﬁrm will not be willing
to incur that “penalty” if the spot market wage is suﬃciently high compared to
the insurance wage. The insurance wage could therefore ﬂuctuate between the
level strictly required to prevent the ﬁrm from dismissing the worker and, by a
3similar reasoning, the level strictly required to prevent the worker from quitting.
The latter case holds when contracts are not binding on the worker, whereas the
former holds when contracts are not binding on the ﬁrm. In the model by Harris
and Holmstrom (1982), ﬁrms do not have reputation concerns, but they learn
about worker ability and adjust the wage to prevent the worker from quitting,
increasing it when the outside market wage is higher than the current wage.
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) ﬁnd evidence that supports this reasoning. They
ﬁnd that lower “historical” unemployment rates since the worker was hired are
associated with higher current wages, arguing that, since workers can quit to accept
a better wage oﬀer in good times, their wage must be set higher in good times.
On the contrary, they do not ﬁnd support for the alternative hypothesis that
wages are set in a spot market (in which case they would be sensitive just to the
contemporaneous unemployment rate) or set under full insurance conditions (in
which case they would be sensitive just to the unemployment rate at the time of
hiring).
Several reasons why workers are less able to bear risks than stockholders have
been pointed out. For example, workers usually have lower wealth and less access
to ﬁnancial markets where to diversify risk, and they have lower expertise on
ﬁnancial issues.
The insurance provided can vary across types of ﬁrms or workers. The share of
risk borne by the ﬁrm will depend crucially on factors such as: the possibilities of
access to ﬁnancial markets by workers and ﬁrms; the persistence of the shocks hit-
ting the ﬁrm; workers’ and ﬁrms’ preferences, namely their degree of risk-aversion;
the sensitivity of ﬁrm output to worker eﬀort, with the wages of crucial workers
(i.e. managers) more closely linked to ﬁrm performance, and therefore subject
to less insurance provision; the amount of ﬁrm resources involved in training the
worker; the probability that the ﬁrm will go bankrupt; the possibility of mon-
itoring output, i.e. the precision of the signal on the agent’s eﬀort, with more
precision leading to less insurance (Guiso et al. (2005) have computed the noise
on performance as the variability over time in the performance of the ﬁrm).
43 Wage setting institutions in Portugal
The Portuguese labor market is characterized by a high level of employment rigid-
ity and remarkable wage ﬂexibility. In fact, its strict job protection legislation,
covering issues such as advance notice required before dismissal, severance pay,
a n dt h er u l e so nu s eo fﬁxed-term or temporary contracts, invariably place the
country among the OECD economies with highest employment rigidity (see for
example OECD 1999). On the contrary, the country ranks among the OECD
economies with highest wage ﬂexibility (see OECD 1992), as wages are highly
responsive to the unemployment rate, despite the regulated framework.
Collective bargaining covers almost all of the workforce, even though union
membership has declined, from 61 percent in 1970 and 1980 to 32 percent in 1990
(OECD 1994: 184). This wide coverage results from widespread mechanisms of
extension of contracts: most often, employers who subscribe to an agreement ap-
ply it to all of their workforce, irrespective of the worker union membership status;
employers or workers representatives can join an existing agreement, subscribing
to a contract they had initially not signed; moreover, the Government can im-
pose mandatory extensions of existing contracts, when workers are not covered
by a trade union, when one of the parties refuses to negotiate or negotiation is
obstructed in any other way.
Studies at the micro level have identiﬁed sources of wage ﬂexibility under this
regulated setting. In particular, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) have found that
wages set by collective bargaining reﬂect to a high extent the degree of power
of the partners negotiating, but subsequent ﬁrm-speciﬁc arrangements reduce the
returns to union power, adjusting wages to the conditions that prevail at the
micro level. Also, Cardoso (1999) had found that the returns to diﬀerent worker
attributes vary widely across ﬁrms.
As a rule, wage negotiations are held yearly and the wage updates take eﬀect
in January each year.
54 Data set and concepts used
Quadros de Pessoal is a matched employer-employee data set gathered by the
Ministry of Employment, based on an inquiry that every company with wage-
earners is legally obliged to ﬁll in. Public administration and domestic service are
not covered, and the coverage of agriculture is low, given its low share of wage-
earners. For the remaining sectors, the mandatory nature of the survey leads to
an extremely high response rate. Each year, around two million workers and 100
to 200 thousand companies are covered. Data for 1991 to 2000 are used.
Reported data cover the ﬁrm and all the workers engaged in the ﬁrm in a ref-
erence week (whether wage-earner, unpaid family member of owners working in
the ﬁrm). Reported variables include the ﬁrm’s location, industry, employment,
sales volume, ownership structure, and date of creation, and the worker’s gen-
der, schooling, age, occupation, skill, date of admission into the company, several
components of wage, duration of work, and collective bargaining contract.
Aw o r k e ri d e n t i ﬁcation code, based on a transformation of the social security
number, enables tracking him/her over time. Extensive checks have been per-
formed to guarantee the accuracy of the data, using gender, date of birth, and
highest schooling level achieved. A ﬁrm identiﬁcation code enables tracking it
over time. Based in particular on the location of the ﬁrm and its oﬃcial identiﬁ-
cation codes, extensive controls are implemented by the data gathering agency to
guarantee that a ﬁrm is not assigned a diﬀerent number later on.
Gross hourly earnings were computed as
monthw = bw + sen + reg,
where bw stands for base-wage, sen are seniority-indexed components of pay, and
reg are other regularly paid components. Wages were deﬂated using the Consumer
Price Index.
A major issue concerns the empirical measurement of ﬂuctuations in product
markets. The shock aﬀecting the ﬁrm has been deﬁned using: the industry output
price (Gamber 1988) (Christoﬁdes and Oswald 1992); the industry proﬁt( B l a n c h -
6ﬂower et al. 1996) (Christoﬁdes and Oswald 1992); ﬁrm proﬁts, in studies that
rely however on wage data also aggregated for the ﬁrm level (Hildreth and Oswald
1997) (Nickell and Wadhwani 1990). Abowd and Lemieux (1993) rely on a set
of assumptions to compute a proﬁtability variable (quasi-rents per worker) at the
ﬁrm level, and use the price of exports and imports at the industry level to instru-
ment it. Guiso et al. (2005) use value added instead of proﬁts, arguing that it is
the variable directly subject to stochastic ﬂuctuations, being more reliable than
proﬁts. A similar option was taken by Estev˜ ao and Tevlin (2003), who nevertheless
used industry data. Holzer and Montgomery (1993) used ﬁrm sales, with wages
averaged for the ﬁrm level. We use sales as our indicator of ﬁrm performance,
arguing that it captures demand uncertainty, as shocks in product demand are
directly reﬂected in changes in sales. Given ﬂuctuations in demand, output could
remain unchanged if prices would adjust fully and instantaneously, but since that
is not the case, output will undergo ﬂuctuations (Baily 1974). Sales were deﬂated
using the GDP deﬂator.
Details on the construction of the database, sample sizes, and descriptive statis-
tics are presented in appendix.
5 Firm performance
B a s e do nt h es p e c i ﬁcation used by Guiso et al. (2005), ﬁrms’ performance is
modeled as
Salesjt = γt + ρSalesj,t−1 + X
0
jtΓ + ηj + ²jt (1)
where Salesjt is the logarithm of sales of ﬁrm j in period t, Xjt is a vector of ﬁrm
characteristics that includes a set of industry and location dummies, γt represents
period t speciﬁcc o n s t a n t ,ρ and Γ are parameters to be estimated, ηj is the ﬁrm
speciﬁce ﬀect, and ²jt is the remaining component of the error term.
Estimation of equation (1) by OLS or the usual panel models, ﬁxed or random
eﬀects, is inconsistent in the presence of the lagged dependent variable, since, by
deﬁnition, Salesj,t−1 is correlated with ηj. Following Arellano and Bond (1991),
7one possible solution is to take ﬁrst diﬀerences, eliminating the ﬁxed eﬀect, and
then estimate equation (1) using a generalized method of moments (GMM) proce-
dure. The set of instruments include lagged levels of the dependent variable and
the remaining regressors. The span of the lag of the dependent variable depends
on the serial correlation observed in the residuals of the model.
This solution has poor ﬁnite sample properties concerning bias and precision
when the available instruments are weak. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the
solution of Arellano and Bond (1991) has a large downward ﬁnite-sample bias when
the time series are persistent and the number of periods is small. An alternative
solution is to implement a system GMM estimation, for ﬁrst-diﬀerences and levels,
as argued by Blundell and Bond (1998). Compared to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced esti-
mator, the system estimator assumes additionally that the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the
lagged dependent variable, and explanatory variables, are not correlated with the
ﬁrms’ speciﬁce ﬀects, ηj. So, lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences can be used as instruments
in the level equations for the lagged dependent variable, and ﬁrst-diﬀerences of
the explanatory variables are also valid instruments. Again the extent of the lag
depends on residuals’ serial correlation.
We estimate equation (1) using the system GMM procedure based on the follow-
ing instruments: (i) Salesj,t−3 and earlier levels of this variable, in the equations in
ﬁrst-diﬀerences; (ii) ∆Salesi,t−2 in the equations in levels. The remaining regres-
sors are treated as exogenous, and introduced in levels as instruments. Following
the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005), we report in Table 1 the results for
the 2—step GMM estimation procedure.
Sales are relatively persistent over time, with a coeﬃcient on lagged sales of .62.
Our results indicate that industry dummies are jointly signiﬁcant, just like time
dummies and region dummies. According to the Sargan test, we do not reject the
validity of our instruments at the 1% and 5% levels. The serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals indicates that we should be using lagged levels of sales
dated t − 3 and earlier, as we do.
In Table 2 we report the autocovariance structure for ∆²jt.T h er e s u l t sc o n ﬁrm
8Table 1: Sales regression
Variable Estimate
Log sales at t-1 .617 (.032)
Region dummies 8.901 [.064]
Industry dummies 114.2 [.000]












The regression has been estimated by the system
GMM procedure discussed in Blundell and Bond
(1998). The instruments are discussed in the text.
The dependent variable is log real sales. Robust stan-
dard errors reported in parentheses; p-values in brack-
ets. For region, industry and year dummies, the joint
F −statistic is reported. Sargan-df stands for the de-
grees of freedom of the Sargan test. AR shows the test
for serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals.
Table 2: Firms’ autocovariances









The autocovariances are computed using all
years pooled.
9our choice of instruments. After 3 lags the covariance of ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals
is insigniﬁcant. These results are of particular interest for the speciﬁcation of the
structure of the error term which will take place in Section 7.
6 Worker earnings
Workers’ wages are speciﬁed as
Wageijt = φt + δWageij,t−1 + K
0
ijtΦ + ϕi + αPjt + βTjt + ψijt (2)
where Wage ijt stands for the logarithm of monthly wage of worker i engaged
in ﬁrm j in period t,a n dK includes industry, region, education, and gender
dummies, as well as age and age squared. The ﬁrst component of the error term
is the worker speciﬁce ﬀect, ϕi. Following Guiso et al. (2005), we include in
the wage regression the permanent and transitory components of ﬁrm speciﬁc
shock, Pjt and Tjt, respectively. The parameters α and β capture the impact
of these shocks on wages. Finally, ψijt is the remaining component of the error
term not captured by the worker speciﬁce ﬀect or the ﬁrm speciﬁcities. In the
current section we concentrate on estimation and analysis of the composite error
term ωijt = ϕi + αPjt + βTjt + ψijt, and delay to section 7 further analysis of the
diﬀerent components.
Again, we have used the system GMM procedure to estimate equation (2). We
use levels of wage lagged 4 periods and earlier as instruments for ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
equations, and lagged 3 periods ﬁrst-diﬀerences of wages as instruments for equa-
tions in levels. The remaining regressors are assumed exogenous and introduced in
levels. The results for the corrected 2—step system GMM estimation are reported
in Table 3.1
Wages show a high degree of persistence, with a coeﬃcient on lagged wage
above .8. Industry dummies are not jointly signiﬁcant, while region dummies are
marginally insigniﬁcant at the 10% level. The test for overidentifying restrictions
1We have considered each employment spell as a pair worker-ﬁrm, since we are interested in the provision of
wage insurance by a given ﬁrm, and not the overall insurance the worker may enjoy when switching ﬁrms.
10Table 3: Wage regression
Variable Estimate
Log wage at t-1 .814 (.066)
Region dummies 7.684 [.104]
Industry dummies 5.497 [.856]












The dependent variable is log real monthly wage. See
the note to Table 1.
Table 4: Workers’ autocovariances









The autocovariances are computed using all
years pooled. ∆ωijt is the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
composite residual from equation (2).
11does not reject our instruments. Table 4 reports the covariance structure of ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced residuals associated with equation (2), ∆ωijt.F i r s t - d i ﬀerencing implies
that ∆ωijt lacks ϕi; i.e.,i ti sd e ﬁned only as a function of the remaining three
components of the error term in equation (2). The results support our choice of
instruments in Table 3.
7 Insurance provision by the ﬁrm
To quantify the insurance provided by ﬁrms to their workers we need ﬁrst to
estimate the sensitivity parameters, α and β, and then to estimate the diﬀerent
variance components of the error terms associated with equations (1) and (2). We
report our main ﬁndings in Table 5.
We start by showing in Panel A the covariance structures in the matched sample
of ﬁrms and workers, which contains 71580 observations. The ﬁrst two columns
report results similar to those shown in Tables 2 and 4. The last column shows
that the covariance between the worker’s and the ﬁrm’s lagged shocks is positive
and signiﬁcant, which is a ﬁrst indication that ﬁrms do not provide full insurance
to their workers.
To assess insurance within the ﬁrm we now focus our attention on the relation
between changes in workers’ residuals, ∆ωijt, and changes in the ﬁrms’ residuals,
∆²jt. In what follows we borrow the formulation and estimation strategy proposed
by Guiso et al. (2005), adjusting for the speciﬁcities of our analysis. Firms’ error
term, ²jt, is formulated as the sum of two components: a random walk and a
MA(1), such that ²jt = ζjt +˜ νjt − θ˜ νj,t−1,w h e r eζjt = ζj,t−1 +˜ ujt.B y a s s u m i n g
that E(˜ u2
jt)=σ2
˜ u, E(˜ ν2
jt)=σ2
˜ ν for all t, E(˜ νjs˜ νjt)=E(˜ ujs˜ ujt)=0f o rs 6= t,a n d
E(˜ νjs˜ ujt) = 0 for all s and t, we expect that after two periods the autocovariance
of ∆²jt goes to zero. Empirically, Table 2 gives support to this speciﬁcation, since
we observe that autocovariances are zero for lags above 2, and non-zero for two
or less lags. The last component of the error term in equation (2) is deﬁned as
ψijt = ϑijt + ξijt − λξij,t−1,w i t hϑijt = ϑij,t−1 + µijt. This speciﬁcation is also not
rejected by the results for the autocovariances in ∆ωijt, Table 4.
12Table 5: Testing for insurance
A. Covariances
τ E(∆ωjt,∆ωj,t−τ) E(∆²jt,∆²j,t−τ) E(∆ωjt,∆²j,t−τ)
0 .0610 .8102 -.0012
(.0016) (.0302) (.0011)
1 -.0302 -.3631 .0026
(.0011) (.0181) (.0011)
B. Sensitivity to permanent and transitory shocks







C. Variance components and insurance coverage
Firm Worker
σ2




˜ v .4408 σ2
µ .0315
(.0375) (.0158)
θ -.1561 λ -.1781
(.0386) (.1637)
Ratio .3111
The covariances are computed for the matched sample, and using all years pooled. The
estimation procedure and instruments used in part B are explained in the text. The
F − test refers to the ﬁrst-stage regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses;
p-values in brackets. The ratio is deﬁned in the text.
At the core of the estimation strategy lies an instrumental variables regression,
whose speciﬁc instruments allow the identiﬁcation of the parameters of interest;
i.e. α, the sensitivity of wages to permanent shocks, and β, the sensitivity of
wages to transitory shocks. In both cases, the dependent variable is ∆ωijt,a n dt h e
explanatory variable is ∆²jt. Consistent estimates of these variables are obtained
from sales and wage regressions presented in Tables 1 and 3, respectively. Guiso
et al. (2005) show that (
P2
τ=−2 ∆²j,t−τ)k is a valid set of instruments to estimate
α, while the estimation of β can be based on the instruments (∆²j,t−τ)k.
To estimate both α and β we have used the feasible eﬃcient GMM procedure,
controlling for error correlation within ﬁrms.2 In each regression the speciﬁci n -
2In the permanent shock regression we clearly reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic error terms, which
13struments are deﬁned for k=1,..,4. For both regressions, a likelihood-ratio test
rejects the null that the extra powers of the instruments are redundant.3 The
overidentifying restriction tests do not reject the validity of instruments used in
both regressions, and from the F −test we conclude that the instruments used in
each regression are jointly signiﬁcant. Finally, we performed the exogeneity test
for ∆²jt based on the diﬀerence in the Hansen-Sargan statistic between a model
w h e r ei ti sa s s u m e de x o g e n o u sa n do u ra l t e r n a t i v em o d e lw h e r ew et a k ei ta se n -
dogenous. The test rejects the null that ∆²jt is exogenous. This result implies
that we also reject the equality between the sensitivity to both types of shocks.
We conclude from Panel B that workers’ wages are not sensitive to transitory
shocks on ﬁrms’ performance, but they respond to ﬁrms’ permanent shocks.4 The
elasticity of wages to permanent shocks to ﬁrms’ performance is .09 (compared to
.07 in Guiso et al. (2005) for Italy).
Following the evidence provided by Altonji and Segal (1996), we estimated the
diﬀerent variance components using equally weighted minimum distance. Panel
C reports the results. From Guiso et al. (2005), we can deﬁne the two variances














These are the variances of the permanent shock and the transitory shock, respec-
tively. We estimate that σ2
u is .56, and σ2
v is .66, which amounts to a considerable
variability. The moving average coeﬃcient is about -.16. All three estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant. For workers the variance of transitory shocks, σ2
ξ, is .0042,
but non-signiﬁcant, while the variance of permanent shocks, σ2
µ,i ss i g n i ﬁcant and
just above .03. The moving average parameter estimate is -.18, and insigniﬁcant.
These results are consistent with our analysis from Panel B. Our results also show
that the diﬀerent variances are considerably higher for ﬁrms than for workers.
In order to compute the portion of wage variability that can be attributed to
justiﬁes the use of GMM. For example, the Pagan and Hall test discussed in Baum et al. (2003) has a p − value
of .0279. For the transitory shock the evidence on heteroskedasticity is mixed. However, since our sample is large
enough for asymptotic results to be valid, and given that IV gives inconsistent inference results if errors are in
fact heteroskedastic, we adopted a conservative strategy and implemented also the GMM procedure in this case.
The following conclusions on transitory shocks are not changed if we use generalized IV instead of GMM.
3The p-value of the tests is always below .001.
4The p − value associated with the estimate .0864 is exactly .1.















conclude that approximately 31% of the total variability in wages can be explained
by ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. For the Italian labor market, Guiso et al. conclude that this
ratio is about 15%. In comparison with Italy, Portugal also presents much higher
variances of the shocks for both sales and wages. Combining the evidence gathered
so far, we conclude that Portuguese ﬁrms provide less insurance to their workers,
when compared to Italian ﬁrms, a result in line with the high wage ﬂexibility
pointed out by studies on Portugal.
Finally, we analyze heterogeneity in insurance provision by ﬁrms. Table 6 re-
ports the sensitivity of wages to permanent and transitory shocks, taking into
account diﬀerent occupations (Manager), the volatility of ﬁrm sales (SDSales),
the threat of bankruptcy, the origin of the capital (Foreign or national), ﬁrm
size (FSize), the number of industries in which the ﬁrm operates (NInd), and its
number of establishments (NEst).5 To estimate these regressions we implemented
once more the GMM procedure used in Panel B of Table 5, and deﬁne the extra
instruments as the previous instruments interacted with the new variables. The
validity of the instruments used is not rejected in both regressions. Since we have
multiple endogenous regressors, Shea’s (1997) partial R2 are reported.6
The main feature of these results is that managers are not fully insured against
transitory shocks, as opposed to the rest of the workforce. However, managers and
workers with other occupations receive equal protection against permanent shocks.
Firms with higher variability in their sales oﬀer more insurance to permanent
changes in their performance. this result is in line with the reasoning by Guiso et
al. (2005), who interpret sales variability as an indicator of noise in the precision of
the signal the ﬁrm receives on the eﬀort of its workers. A less precise signal would
reduce the possibility of the ﬁrm to link the wage paid to the worker performance,
5Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of logarithm of sales for the period under analysis, ﬁrm
size is deﬁned by the logarithm of the number of employees, and Bankruptcy is the percentage of ﬁrms that go
bankrupt in a given district and region.
6As before, the diﬀerent heteroskedasticity tests do not provide a unique answer for the transitory shock
regression. For this regression only, if generalized IV is used instead of GMM the relevant change would be that
the coeﬃcient on ∆²jt ∗ Manager is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. For the permanent shocks regression, the
Pagan and Hall heteroskedasticity general test has a p−value of .0857 for the permanent shock regression, while
the Koenker test has a p − value of .0660.
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∆²jt ∗ Manager -.0616 .0055
(.0404) (.0021)
[.0187] [.3708]
∆²jt ∗ SDSales -.1070 .0016
(.0453) (.0053)
[.0230] [.3214]
∆²jt ∗ Bankruptcy -.0213 -.0001
(.0182) (.0008)
[.0135] [.4151]
∆²jt ∗ Foreign .1570 .0057
(.0517) (.0071)
[.0193] [.3607]
∆²jt ∗ FSize -.0209 .0030
(.0195) (.0035)
[.0182] [.3467]
∆²jt ∗ NInd -.0478 -.0036
(.0240) (.0082)
[.0362] [.3032]




J-test: p − value .3631 .7755
The dependet variable is ∆ωijt. T h ei n s t r u m e n t su s e di ne a c hr e -
gression are explained in the text. Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses; Shea’s (1997) partial R2 in brackets. We account for
within ﬁrm correlation of residuals. We report the J-test for the va-
lidity of the instruments.
16and therefore more wage insurance would be provided. Foreign ﬁrms provide less
insurance to permanent shocks. Firms that diversify their activity among diﬀerent
industries oﬀer on average a higher level of protection against permanent shocks.
8 Conclusion
The paper evaluated the impact of product market uncertainty on workers wages,
relying on data of remarkable qualify to estimate dynamic panel data models.
Results point to the rejection of the full insurance hypothesis. Workers’ wages
respond to permanent shocks to ﬁrm performance, whereas they are not sensitive to
transitory shocks. Once we consider the heterogeneity of insurance provision across
types of ﬁrms and workers, we ﬁnd that managers are not fully insured against
transitory shocks, while they receive the same protection against permanent shocks
as workers in other occupations. Firms with a higher variability in their sales, and
those that operate in diﬀerent industries, oﬀer more insurance against permanent
shocks to their performance. We conclude that, in comparison to Italy, Portuguese
ﬁrms provide less insurance to their workers, corroborating evidence previously
reported on the high degree of wage ﬂexibility in Portugal.
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Appendix: Longitudinal linked employer-employee data set
Checks on the consistency of data
After merging the worker data across years, inconsistencies were identiﬁed if the
worker gender or date of birth was reported changing, or if the highest schooling
level achieved was reported decreasing over time. In that case, the information
reported over half the times has been taken as the correct one7 (0.8%, 2.3%, 5.2%
of the observations have been corrected, respectively for gender, birth date and
education). Workers with inconsistent data after the introduction of the previous
corrections were dropped. The whole information on the worker was dropped,
whichever the incorrect number of observations identiﬁed (1.7%, 1.1%, and 4.3%
of the observations, respectively for gender, birth date and schooling). Workers
with missing age or schooling after the introduction of the previous corrections
were dropped (respectively 0.7% and 1.7% of the observations, corresponding to
2.1% and 2% of the workers).
Constraints imposed
The analysis focuses on workers and ﬁrms in manufacturing and services private
sector in mainland Portugal.
On the worker side, we have retained wage-earners working full-time, aged 18 to
65, whose wage is not below the national minimum wage8 (which led to dropping
20%, 2%, and 3% of the dataset, respectively). Outliers in wage growth have
been dropped9, which corresponded to a very small share of the data base, 0.03%.
Workers observed just once in the database cannot be considered in the estimation
of the models used (and thus 5% have been dropped). This is the full set of workers,
which comprises over ten million observations. Due to the large size of the full
7Note that this requirement is more demanding than just considering the modal value as the accurate one.
8May drop apprentices and handicapped workers.
9Log diﬀerence in real wages either greater than 2 or smaller than -.5
21data set it was not feasible to run the worker computations on the full data set
and we have therefore used a 2 percent random sample of workers (keeping all the
yearly observations for the selected workers). Descriptive statistics on this sample,
comprising 205,929 yearly observations on 42,008 workers, are presented in table
7.10
On the ﬁrm side, we have kept ﬁrms operating full-year, and whose sales are not
missing or outlier11 (thus dropping 3%, 9%, and 0.2% of the ﬁrms, respectively).12
Firms that were ever larger than 20 workers have been kept for analysis, since
they are more likely to be run in entrepreneurial terms. Given the very small size
structure of the ﬁrms in the Portuguese economy, this led to keeping 12% of the
ﬁrms. The set of ﬁrms under analysis comprises 131,100 yearly observations on
18,366 ﬁrms. Descriptive statistics are reported in table 8.13
Table 7: Descriptive statistics on workers
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
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Continued on next page...
10The dynamics in the models under estimation determine that a smaller number of individuals will be consid-
ered in the regressions.
11Log diﬀerence in real wages either greater than 5 or smaller than -5.
12Firms in the ﬁrst few months of their existence, not yet one year, were excluded, to avoid capturing sales
ﬂuctuations that are due to part-year operation.
13The dynamics in the models under estimation determine that a smaller number of ﬁrms will be considered in
the regressions.
22... table 7 continued


















Table 8: Descriptive statistics on ﬁrms
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Log real sales (1000 PTE) 12.93 1.45
Number workers in ﬁrm 58.23 170.8
Number of establishments in ﬁrm 2.25 9
Number of industries in ﬁrm 1.09 0.38
Share ﬁrms bankrupt in province 0.09 0.04
Variability ﬁrm sales over time: sd log real sales 0.5 0.51
Industry
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